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TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION OF
THE FIRM: PROBLEMS AND
PERSPECTIVES
Thomas E. Abeltshauser
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law concerning the constitution of the firm and the development of an EEC corporate law have been important issues at both the
national and Community levels during the last twenty years. Due to
the approval of the Single European Act' and the intention of the Eu-

ropean legislator 2 to complete harmonization of the European internal
market at the end of 1992, 3 the harmonization projects concerning the
constitution of the firm and a statute concerning the European Corpo4
ration ("Societas Europea" or "S.E.") are gaining new attention.
This article will discuss in particular the proposed EEC directive
on the harmonization of corporate structures as well as the proposed
regulation of the Societas Europea. Initially, these proposals were
strongly oriented toward German law. As such, a corporation had to
have a managing board as well as a so-called supervisory board and a
* Hochschulassistent, Dr.jur., LL.M. University of Giessen Law School Germany. I have
to thank Mr. John Gatto and Mr. Martin Peters, both of the University of Giessen Law School,
for language and cite checking. Special thanks go to Danetta L. Beaushaw and Dr. C. Zellweger
of the MIlL for editing the article's language and footnotes.
1. Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987); BULL. EC, Supp. 2/86
(1986) [hereinafter Single European Act].
2. I will use the term "European Legislator" as follows: Unlike the legislative processes of
the national legislatures of the Member States, the legislative process on the Community level is
much more indirect. First, the EC Commission proposes legislative projects such as the harmonization of certain areas of corporate law. Second, the European Parliament and the EC Economic
and Social Committee give their opinion on the proposal. Finally, the EC Council discusses the
proposal, which can require several years of hard work. In the end, it is the Council which brings
the proposal of a harmonization directive into force. "European Legislator" will refer then to a
composite of EC lawmakers. See B. BEUTLER, B. BIEBER, J. PIPKORN & J. STREIL, DIE
EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHAFr-RE CHTSORDNUNG UND POLITIK 105 (1987) [hereinafter DIE
EUROPAJSCHE GEMEINSCHAFr]; E. STEIN, M. WAELBROECK & P. HAY, EUROPEAN COMMUTY LAW AND INsTrruTioNs IN PERSPEc"lvE 30 (1963).

3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature Mar. 25,
1987, art. 8A, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] as amended by Single European Act,
supra note 1, art. 13.
4. See, ag, Lutter, Europa und das Unternehmensrecht, in VORTRAGE, REDEN UND BERICHTE AUS DEM EUROPA-INSITUT DER UNIVERSITAT DES SAARLANDES

118 (1988); see

also Abeltshauser, Strukturalternativen fur eine europdische Unternehmensverfassung, in
EuRoPiwscHE INTEGRATION ALs HERAUSFORDERUNG DES RECHTS: MEHR MARKTRECHT,
WENIGER EINZELGESETZE 10 (1990).
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general meeting of stockholders.5 Since the EEC Commission published the so-called "Green Paper,"'6 which contains a comparative
analysis of national legal systems' requirements for the structure of
corporations and provisions for co-determination rights for employees
at the board level, the new proposals concerning the constitution of
the firm are taking different "structural options" into account. Accordingly, the fifth directive, the S.E. regulation and the special S.E.
co-determination directive provide the national legislatures with a
choice between several approximately equal options, thus fulfilling the
principle of functional equivalence.
Even though this new approach was rather astonishing under a
system of legal harmonization, it was necessary due to the very different legal, economic, historical and even ideological structures in the
Member States which created difficulties for the harmonization of corporate law. For example, these problems appeared during the negotiations of the fourth and seventh directives which concerned the law
regulating the financial statements of single as well as groups of corporations. The European legislator solved these problems by offering a
variety of options to the Member States. Without these options, the
directives would not have passed. Of course, it is questionable
whether such an approach leads to real harmonization of national
legal structures, or whether the European legislator instead freezes
these structures only on a European level without any harmonizing
effect in the future.
Taking this criticism into account, I will first discuss the proposed
fifth directive and the proposed regulation of the Societas Europea.
Second, I will address the general problem posed by the functions of
European legal harmonization and ask whether the fifth directive and
the S.E. regulation correspond with them. Finally, I will consider the
question of whether a new approach to legal harmonization can be
defined under the Single European Act, and how the fifth directive and
the S.E. would be affected.
5. See, eg., Proposition d'une cinquidme directive tendant d coordonner lesgaranties qui sont
exigdes dans lesEtats membres, des soci'tdi
au sens de 'article 58 paragraphe 2 du trait4 pour
protiger lesintdrvets tant des associds que des tiers en ce qui concerne la structure des socidtds
anonymes ainsi que les pouvoirs et obligations de leurs organes, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 131)
49 (1972); BULL. EC, Supp, 10/72 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 Proposal]; Proposal for a Council
regulation on the Statute for European Companies, BULL. EC, Supp. 4/75 (1975) [hereinafter
1975 Proposal].
6. Employee Participation and the Structure of Companies, BULL. EC, Supp. 8/75 (1975)
[hereinafter Green Paper]; see also the critical remarks of Diubler, The Employee Participation
Directive - A Realistic Utopia?, 14 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 457 (1977).
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LEGAL HARmONIZATION PROJECTS

The 1972 Proposalof the Fifth Directive Concerning the
Structure of Corporations in the Member States

In 1972, the EEC Commission published the first proposal of a
fifth directive regarding the structure of the stock corporation.7 Article 2 of this directive favored a dual supervisory structure for publicly
held corporations, requiring them to set up three entities: a board for
business management, a supervisory board and a general assembly of
shareholders. Great Britain, Italy and France in particular did not
agree with such a proposal because, in those Member States, a corporation's affairs were managed by a unified board. Such a board was of
course divided into a controlling part on the one hand, and a managing or executive part on the other.
The Commission's proposal of co-determination rights for employees of the corporation posed another controversial issue. Under article
4 of this proposal, corporations with more than 500 employees had to
provide co-determination rights in the supervisory board ranging up to
one third of its seats.8 Beyond provision for employee representatives,
article 2(2X3) also opened the supervisory board to other representatives of the so-called "public or general interests." 9
Apart from the supervisory board structure, article 2(3) of the proposal also offered the option of a so-called "cooptation system."
Under this model, currently used in the Netherlands, the supervisory
board has the power to nominate its own members. These members
have to be neutral (e.g., outside experts); neither shareholders nor employees of the corporation may sit on the supervisory board. Of
course, the corporation's shareholders and employees have a right to
object to the nomination of a representative.
B.

The European Corporation-

Societas Europea

In 1975, the first proposal of a regulation concerning a European
Stock Corporation also favored a supervisory structure and co-determination rights for employees and representatives of the public or general interest.10 The latter had to be co-opted by the shareholders' and
7. 1972 Proposal, supra note 5.
8. 1972 Proposal, supra note 5, at art. 4(2).
9. It is, of courMs, rather difficult to define exactly what kind of interests have to be taken into
account under the term "public or general interests." See Pipkorn, Zur Entwicklung des
europdischen Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrechts (I), 141 ZErrSCHRIFr FOR DAS GESAMTE
HANDELS- umD WnTSCHAmcREcHr [ZHR] 330, 366 (1977).
10. 1975 Proposal, supra note 5, at art. 74(a).
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employees' representatives with a two-thirds majority vote. I A representative of the public interest had to have sufficient knowledge about
business judgments and had to adopt a neutral stance. The function of
such a pluralistic structure of the supervisory board was to legitimate
the corporation's general business decisions in relation to society.1 2
The corporation's employees had to choose their representatives unless they voted to decline representation in the supervisory board.1 3
Since the Commission published the second proposal in 1975, negotiations in the EEC Council have not been very successful. In particular, the differences of opinion between the Member States involved
the proposed co-determination rights for employees and public interests as well as the supervisory board structure. Debate also centered
upon whether it is necessary to integrate a special law concerning
groups of corporations into the Statute, since such legal provisions are
only known in Germany and Portugal.
The Commission published a new proposal in 1989.14 This one is
very similar to the new proposal of a fifth directive, which is discussed
in detail later. Under this new regime, the corporation can choose
between a supervisory or unified board structure (between a dual or
monistic structure).1 5 Co-determination rights are regulated by a special legal harmonization directive based on article 54(3)(g) of the EEC
Treaty. Under this directive, the national legislatures, which have to
transform the directive into national law, can choose between five different options of co-determination. These options provide: (I) participatory rights for employees in the supervisory board; (II)
participatory rights for employees in the controlling part of the unified
board; (III) the co-optation of new supervisory board members; (IV)
the co-optation of directors sitting in the controlling part of a unified
board; or (V) employee representatives on a special employee committee. If the employees and shareholders of the S.E. do not come to an
agreement concerning co-determination rights, the corporation has to
11. See id. at arts. 74(a), 75.
12. Pipkorn, supra note 9, at 366. Pipkorn indicates that it is not possible to define "public
interest" exactly, but it is necessary to relate the interpretation of the term narrowly to the subject of the corporation.
13. 1975 Proposal, supra note 5, at art. 138.
14. Proposalfor Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 32 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 263) 41 (1989); E.C. COMM'N Docs., COM(88) 268 final - SYN 218 [hereinafter
1989 Proposal]; Proposalfor a Council Directive complementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees in the Europeancompany, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 263) 69 (1989); E.C. COMM'N Docs., COM(89) 268 final - SYN 219; Internalmarket and
industrialcooperation-Statutefor the European Company-Internal Market White Paper, E.C.
COMM'N Docs., COM(88) 320 final, point 137 [hereinafter White Paper on the Statute for the
European Company].
15. See Single European Act, supra note 1, at art. 62.
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use a certain "standard model" under the law of the corporation's
seat. 16 This model must satisfy the highest standard and must guarantee at least the information and consultation rights under article 5(2)
of the special directive supplementing the Statute.
When considering the complexity of legal harmonization in this
field, the difficult negotiations between the Member States and the
ongoing process of the European integration process, it naturally
makes sense to shorten the former statute of 284 articles to the present
137 articles. It is also convenient to exclude provisions from the Statute concerning subjects which the European legislator already has harmonized or will harmonize in the future (e.g. employee rights on the
plant level, taxation, legal provisions concerning corporate groups, accounting rules, etc.) because the Statute can refer to these directives or
17
to national legal provisions which already have been harmonized.
On the other hand, an immense number of new problems arise from
the new proposal which could prevent the EEC Council from passing
the Statute until the end of 1992 as planned.
One basic problem concerns the statutory basis of the new proposal. The former proposals were based on article 235 of the EEC
Treaty. Now the Commission is using the new article 100A which is
strongly connected with articles 8A and 8B of the EEC Treaty and the
Single European Act.18 Article 8A regulates the integration process
creating a Single European Market by December 31, 1992. Within
this framework article 100A regulates the harmonization of legal rules
in the field of private and public law so that the Single European Market can be established. Contrary to article 100, which demands a
16. 1989 Proposal, supra note 14, at art. 6(13).
17. The European legislator has already harmonized the following subject matters: The First
Directive of March 9, 1968, (Publicity Directive) deals primarily with the uniformity of minimum disclosure provisions for company information, both as provided in the commercial register
and in the press, 14 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 65) 8 (1968); the Second Directive of December 13,
1976, (Capital Directive) deals with conditions of establishment and the minimum or stated capitalof stock corporations, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) 1 (1976); the Third Directive of
October 9, 1978, (Merger Directive) deals with the merger of stock corporations, 21 O.J. EuR.
COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978); the Fourth Directive of July 25, 1978, (Accounts Directive) regulates accounting, balance sheets and the content and publication of the annual report of all kinds
of limited corporations, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978); the Sixth Directive of December 17, 1982, (Corporate Split-Up Directive) concerns the splitting-up of stock corporations
through takeovers and re-incorporations, 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 47 (1982); the Seventh Directive of June 13, 1983, (Groups of Companies Accounts Directive) complements the
Fourth Directive by setting up the common framework for the annual reports of groups of companies, notably transnational corporations, 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1983); the
Eighth Directive of April 10, 1984, (Auditor Directive) deals with the admission and qualification of auditors, 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 126) 20 (1984); the Regulation of July 25, 1985,
(The European Economic Interest Grouping) provides for the creation of a flexible legal association form for transnational cooperation, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985).
18. See supra note 1.
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unanimous vote, "legal measures" under article 100A can pass with a
majority vote.
Even if the new statute concerning a European stock corporation
will serve as an important element in establishing a Single European
Market, it is questionable whether the regulation proposed is a "legal
harmonization measure" as contemplated by article 100A(l) of the
EEC Treaty. Until now, the Commission has used "directives" 19 to
harmonize national law. Directives are legal instruments with which
the European legislator can approximate a certain subject matter (e.g.,
publication requirements of a corporation, accounting rules for single
corporations as well as groups of companies, take-over rules, etc.).
The harmonization process itself does not "unify" a certain field of
law; it only prescribes a certain standard which the national legislatures must integrate into their national legal systems. Yet the Commission also has the option to unify law by using a regulation.2"
Regulations are directly effective; they are addressed to the Community's citizens rather than to national legislatures.
Article 100A gives the Commission the opportunity to harmonize
law by using not only directives but also regulations. Until now, it has
not been very clear whether. such a regulation is different from the
normal regulation mentioned above, or whether the European legislator created a new type of regulation under article 100A. There are
several critical legal opinions concerning this issue.2 1 Even the Commission declared that the directive should have priority under article
100A, in that the article refers to legal harmonization and not to
unification. 22
Another question arises as to whether the modification of the statutory basis and the fact that the Commission regulates the co-determination issue with a special harmonization directive 23 is nothing more
than a legislative trick for avoiding the unanimous vote under article
235 of the EEC Treaty. Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, as well as
the new article 100A,provide that a majority vote is sufficient to bring
19. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 189.

20. Id.
21. See, eg., Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the 'Single European Act, 24 COMM.
MKT. L. REv. 9 (1987).
22. DIE EUROPXWCHE GEMEINSCHAFr, supra note 2, at 379; Abeltshauser, Der neue
Statutsvorschlag .fir eine Europdische Aktiengeselischaft - Formelle und materellrechtliche
Probleme in DIE AKTIENOESESLLSCHAFr (1990) [hereinafter Abeltshauser, Statsmrschlag]; T.
ABELISHAUSER, STRUKTURALTERNATIVEN FOR EINE EUROPAISCHE UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG 53 (1990) [hereinafter ABELTSHAUSER, STRUKTURALTERNATIVEN]; Schwartz, 30 Jahre
Rechtsanglechung, in EINE ORDNUNrSPOLITJK FOR EUROPA - FESTSCHRIFT FOR H. VON DER
GROEBEN 333, 365 (E. Mestmacker, H. Moiler & H. Schwartz eds. 1987).

23. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 54(3)(g).
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a directive or a regulation into force. Therefore, the simple modification of the statutory basis for the S.E. regulation, together with the
separate directive based now on article 54(3)(g) concerning co-determination rights for employees of a S.E., would probably mean a misuse of the legal form.
The special S.E. co-determination directive is of course a problem
in itself. Why do we need such a special directive in addition to the
fifth directive if the Commission refers to already existing directives
and national law concerning other issues like accounting rules, merger
requirements or the law regulating groups of companies? 24 Even if we
accept such a directive, the "option solution" which features different
models of employee participation raises the question whether these
models are "functionally equivalent," which would of course be necessary under the harmonization principle of the EEC Treaty. 25 Since
these options are very similar to the options under the new fifth directive, as we shall see later, they do not conform to the basic principle of
EC harmonization.
C.

The New Proposal of a Fifth Directive Concerning the Structure
of the Corporation

One of the most interesting projects concerning the harmonization
of the corporation's constitution is the new proposal of a fifth directive. After the EEC Commission did not succeed with the 1972 proposal, which was strongly influenced by German law, it submitted a

special comparative study, the "Green Paper," in

1975.26

Since very

different models of corporate structure exist in the Member States, the
Green Paper focused on the issue of legal harmonization in the field of
27
the corporation's structure and employees' co-determination rights.
The differences which exist are based on very different political, historical and cultural backgrounds. As a result, a single European model
of the firm's constitution would have been too inflexible. Therefore, in
developing a new proposal, the Commission considered different versions of corporate structures and co-determination rights. The new
proposal offered these options for a certain period of time. The Commission still had in mind only one major option for harmonizing the
24. See, e.g., 1989 Proposal, supra note 14, at arts. 7(l)(b), 8(1), 9, 14, 17(3).
25. Concerning this basic principle, see ABELTSHAUSER, STRUKTURALTERNATIVEN, supra
note 22, at 52.
26. See Green Paper, supra note 6; see also the critical remarks of Diiubler, supra note 6.
27. The issues addressed included supervisory versus board structure, different rules concerning the rights and duties of the directors, and very different approaches to participation rights for
employees.
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constitution of the firm after expiration of the period. The transition
period was necessary, however, to facilitate the entire harmonization
process based on one specific version of corporate structure and codetermination rights. 28 According to the Green Paper's proposals, the
European Parliament requested alternative corporate structures and
co-determination systems in its offical statement concerning the new
29
proposal of a fifth directive.
Thus, the European legislator is using two new methods of legal
harmonization by both offering different options as to legal structure
and by referring to a far greater extent to national legal systems. The
first is exhibited in several directives concerning corporate law. By
employing this method, the European legislator proposes certain options which are somewhat similar to national laws and functionally
equivalent. This is the case with the fifth, fourth and seventh direc-

tives. The second method directly recognizes national laws as functionally equivalent. Such a method is based on article 100B of the
EEC Treaty.
Finally, the EEC Commission published a new proposal of a fifth
directive in 1983 which follows the proposals of the Green Paper and
the statement of the European Parliament. 30 The proposed options
concerning the structure of the corporation and co-determination
rights for employees and the public interest should be functionally
equivalent and be in force for a period of at least five years. 3 1 Chapter
II of the new proposal provides that the Member States can choose
between a supervisory or a unified board model.3 2 Chapter III provides special rules for the supervisory board option. The board must
28. See Document of the EC Commission No. 111/1 1/1978-DE; Proposal of the Commission
in the Green Paper, supra note 6, at 43. Under this proposition, a corporation should have an
optional unified board or supervisory board structure with certain participation rights for employees. As an alternative to these options, the national legislatures should also have the opportunity to choose a special employee committee or a collective agreement system which allows
employers and employees to agree on one of the proposed co-determination models. The time of
transition should make it possible to test the different models and to determine one single constitution of the firm. See also Hopt, Grundprobleme der Mitbestimmungin Europa, 13 ZErrSCHIIFr
FOR ARBErT 207 (1982); Abeltshauser, Neuere Entwicklungen im Recht der europdischen Unternehmensverfassungund das Problem geselischaftsrechtlicherRechtsangleichung,in ZERP, EROFFNUNGSVERANSTALTUNG DES ZERP, APRIL 21-22, 1983 - REDEN UND BEITRAGE 141, 146
(1983) [hereinafter Abeltshauser, ZERP EROFNUNGSVERANSTALTUNG].
29. Before a Commission proposal for a new directive or regulation goes officially to the EC
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee have to give their
opinions on these proposals. See E. STEIN, M. WAELBROECK & P. HAY, supra note 2, at 45, 51;
E. STEIN, M. WAELBROECK, P. HAY & J. WEILER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVES 11 (Supp. 1985).
30. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983); BULL. EC, Supp. 6/83 (1983) [hereinafter
1983 Proposal].
31. Id. at art. 63(c)(1).
32. Id. at art. 4(2).
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manage the corporation's affairs under the control of the supervisory
board. The unified board model is open for co-determination rights if
the corporation has more than 1000 employees. 3 3 Article 4(1) states
that the corporation also must consider employees of subsidiaries in
this calculation. The general meeting of the corporation has the right
to nominate two-thirds of the seats of the supervisory board. Onethird of the seats are provided for employee representatives. But the
national legislatures should also have the right to provide the latter
group with a maximum of half of the supervisory board seats. In such
a case, the legislatures should of course ensure that the shareholders'
representatives keep a slight majority, e.g., by a double voting right for
the chairman of the supervisory board. Article 4(c) provides another
option under which the supervisory board members can nominate new
members by co-optation.
Apart from these two options, article 4 allows the organization of
an independent employee committee which has certain information
and consultation rights. 34 These rights also include affairs which the
supervisory board or the controlling part of the unified board must
approve under article 12. The members of the employee committee
are not bound to act in the "interest of the enterprise, ' 35 but they are
36
bound by a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.
Article 4(e) offers another alternative in which the corporation or
an employers' association can regulate co-determination by a special
collective agreement with the employees of the corporation or with an
employees' association. The co-determination model chosen under
such an agreement must be one of the above-mentioned alternatives.
If the parties to the collective agreement are unable to find a solution,
37
one of the other options enters into force automatically.
Decisions of the management board which require approval by the
33. Id.
34. Id. at arts. 4(d) and 11.
35. Id. at art. 10(aX2X1). The so-called "interest of the enterprise" is a concept which differs
slightly from the "interest of the corporation." The "interest of the enterprise" should include
not only the interest of the shareholders of the corporation but also the interests of the employees
working in the corporation and public or general interests. As we will see later, the interest of
the enterprise is a concept which is subject to very different opinions in the legal literature
throughout Europe. Especially in Germany, the discussion became very sophisticated under the
new Co-Determination Act of 1976. Concerning the German discussion, see T.BRINKMANN,
UNTERNEHMENSINTERESSE UND UNTERNEHMENSRECHTWTRUKTUR 36-39 (Frankfurter Wissenschatsrechtliche Studien No. 1 1983); A. GROSSMANN, UNTERNEHMENSZIELE IM AKTIENRECHT 12-15, 32-35, 61-62, 162-63 (Abhandlungen zum deutschen und europiiischen
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht No. 29, 1980); see also the very critical remarks of C. SCHMIDTLEITHOFF, DIE VERANTWORTUNG DER UNTERNEHMENSLEITUNG 45 (1989).

36. See 1983 Proposal, supra note 30, at art. 10(aX2X2).
37. Id. at art. 4(b).
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supervisory board or the controlling side of the board are treated the
same as in the former proposal of a fifth directive. The Member States
have to regulate the civil liability of the unified board as well as the
supervisory board members. 38 Such a liability has to be joint and several and cannot be limited in amount, with the exception that a board
member can prove his innocence. But the delegation of authority to a
lower management level or to other board members does not avoid
liability under the directive. Board members remain liable even if the
supervisory board or the controlling part of the board approves a certain action. The same principle is applicable in the case where the
shareholders' meeting approves the action or gives certain instructions
to the board member.
Finally, article 21(a) provides for another option for the structure
of the corporation and co-determination rights. Under this option, the
Member States can choose a unified board structure, providing for
both executive directors, who represent the corporation and are occupied with its daily affairs, and controlling directors. The whole system
should be functionally equivalent to the supervisory model. This becomes apparent when looking at the formal differentiation between the
executive and the controlling part of the board, a situation which qualifies as a de facto dual structure of the unified board. The number of
controlling directors must be divisible by three. These directors have
to nominate the executive directors. 39 Under article 21(a)(2), big corporations have to nominate a special employee director. Co-determination rights have to follow the same principles as in the supervisory
board model. 40 Therefore, employees of the corporation receive participation rights in the controlling part of the board. 41 Under the unified board structure, it is also possible to provide co-determination
rights in a special employee committee4 2 or to choose between different co-determination models using a collective agreement. Rights and
duties of the board members or the members of the special employee
committee should be the same as under the supervisory board model.
In contrast to the opinion of the European Parliament, the Commission proposal would regulate certain situations concerning groups
of companies. Article 63(b) determines certain exceptions with respect to the control of corporations for integrating the subsidiaries into
the system of co-determination of the fifth directive. Articles 10(a)(2)
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

art. 14(1).
art. 21(aXl)(b).
art. 21(b).
art. 21(d).
art. 21(bX2).
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and 21 (q)(2) which address the "interest of the enterprise" do not apply to these subsidiaries. The directive does not apply to holding companies either. Under article 63(b)(1)(a), controlling companies of
multinational groups of companies can be excluded from the fifth directive if the corporation's purpose is to merely coordinate the financing transactions of the subsidiaries. The fifth directive does not apply
to subsidiaries of groups of companies if the employees of these subsidiaries receive the rights provided by the fifth directive directly from the
controlling corporation. Under article 63(b)(2)(b), exceptions are possible for article 12 (approval of certain management decisions by the
controlling or the supervisory board), article 14 (civil liability) and
article 2 1(s) (delegation of power by the administrative organ concerning certain operations).
III.

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL HARMONIZATION IN THE
FIELD OF CORPORATE LAW

The second step of evaluating the new proposal of the EEC Commission is an analysis of the functions of harmonizing law in general.
This will lead to a new strategy of legal harmonization in Europe, and
then to a final assessment of the fifth directive, the special S.E. codetermination directive and the structural provisions of the S.E.
statute.
A.

The Statutory Basis

In establishing the European Economic Community, 43 the first
Member States created a supranational contractual system which was
not only unique concerning its general programs, 44 but also in relation
to its legal dimensions.45 For instance, the EC has law-making authority under the EEC Treaty. 4" Under article 145, in relation to articles 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty, 47 the EC Council has authority not
43. The term "EC" encompasses the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") established on April 18, 1951, the European Economic Community ("EEC") and the European
Atomic Energy Community established on March 25, 1957.

44. The general goal of the EC is the abolition of trade barriers between Member States and
the establishment of the freedom of movement for goods, services, persons and capital throughout Europe. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 3; see also DIE EUROP.MSCHE GEMEINSCHAFr,

supra note 2, at 37.
45. Ehlermann, Die Rolle des Rechts und der Juristen in der Gemeinschaft, inZERP EROFFNUNGsvERANTALTuNG 45 (1983); M. LUTrER, KAPrrAL, SICHERUNG DER KAPITALAUPBRINGUNG UND KAPITALERHALTUNG IN DEN AKTIEN - UND GMBH - RECHTEN DER

EWO § I, 1 (1964).
46. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 145.
47. The goals mentioned under article 2 of the EEC Treaty include the development of European economic activities, economic stability, increased standard of living, a continuous and balanced expansion and closer relations between Member States through the establishment of a
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only to coordinate the economic policy of the Member States but also
to decide on proposals of the Commission concerning legal harmonization directives and regulations. The Treaty, as well as the law made
in accordance with the Treaty, is directly valid and applicable.
The enforcement of the goals mentioned in articles 2 and 3 of the
EEC Treaty requires a broad harmonization of national law. Article
3(h) in particular requires national legal provisions to be harmonized
as far as such harmonization is necessary to the functioning of the
Common Market. Therefore, legal harmonization is strongly related
to the extent of integration already obtained in the EC and therefore
has a so-called dynamic character which corresponds to the dynamic
48
character of the integration goals of the EC.
The statutory basis for article 3(h) harmonization is article 100, as
well as articles 100A, 100B and 189, para. 3 of the EEC Treaty. Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty in particular regulates the legal harmonization of corporate law.4 9 The EC uses the directive, 50 the
regulation 1 and agreements under international law 52 to harmonize
national law. In doing so the EC not only creates a flexible supranational legal framework, 53 but also considers very different historical,
political and ideological traditions in the Member States.
In the following section we will discuss principles under which the
Member States have integrated legal harmonization into the EEC
Treaty and how these principles have changed functionally during the
integration process.
B. Functions
In the beginning of the European harmonization process, legal harmonization was one element of a very broad concept of functional inCommon Market and the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States. EEC
Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 2.
48. The "dynamic character" concept means that European integration is an ongoing process. Therefore, legal harmonization projects have to refer to the level of European integration
already achieved at that moment. DIE EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHAFT, supra note 2, at 344;
Timmermanns, Die Rechisangleichung im Gesellschaftsrecht - Eine integrations- und rechispolitische Analyse, 48 RABELS ZErrscHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES

PRIVATRECHT [RAflELSZ] 48 (1984); Diubler, supra note 6, at 465.
49. T. ABELTSHAUSER & J. PIPKORN, ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES EUROPAISCHEN GESELLSCHAFrS- UND UNTERNEHMENSRECHTS 25 (European University Institute Working paper No.

85/167, 1985).
50. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 189(3).
51. Id. at art. 189(2).
52. Id. at art. 220.
53. Concerning the concept of "supranationalism," see E. STEIN, M. WAELBROECK & P.
HAY, supra note 2, at 20; Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Characterof Supranationalism, I Y.B. EUR. L. 267, 271-73 (1981).

Summer 1990]

European Constitution of the Firm

1247

tegration. 54 Contrary to the pluralistic concept of integration in which
a community of states communicates about and cooperates in the resolution of problems, functional concepts aspire to an international community, which prevails over national states in certain technical areas
converted to a supranational and harmonized level. Under this concept, certain constraints will finally lead to the organization of functional units on an international level. The so-called "neofunctionalism" even reaches beyond this concept. Here, collective decisions of supranational institutions are the result of the integration
process. Member States must also transfer a certain part of their decision-making authority to these institutions." In the context of increasing international economic relations and international
competition, those specific pressures can be absorbed in part by a necessary internationalization of production structures and opening up of
a large market inside Europe for those companies which are still nationally based. Consequently, "spill-over" effects would guarantee
political unity and integration over a long period of time. It was expected that cooperation would also become necessary later as a result
of the interdependence of non-controversial and controversial areas,
i.e., integration would progress automatically, once the growth of supranational tasks 56 resulted in supranational institutions which have
to increasingly intervene in the political decision-making process and
thus need political powers (namely the process of political
57
integration).
Economically, the integration process of a pure free-trade zone,
which provides simply for the elimination of customs, duties and other
trade barriers between the Member States, was expected to develop
further toward full integration with standardization of policies and
political institutions via the Customs Union (a common external
tariff), a Common Market (mobility of production factors) and an
58
Economic Union (harmonization of economic policies).
The integration concept of the European Community is based on
the principles of market parity, economic freedom and freedom of
competition, and was derived from neo-liberal concepts of order until
the mid-1970's. 59 Production factors were to be released from their
54. DIE EUROPASCHE GEMEINSCHAFT, supra note 2, at 58; Behrens, Integrationstheonie,45
RABELsZ 8 (1981); K. NAGELS & A. SORGE, INDUSTRIELLE DEMOKRATIE IN EUROPA 30
(1977); M. CAPPELLETI, M. SECCOMBE & J. WEILER, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, Bd. 1, 3.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Behrens, supra note 54, at 22.
Concerning this term, see Weiler, supra note 53, at 268.
K. NAGELS & A. SORGE, supra 54, at 30.
Behrens, supra note 54, at 30.
F. MARX, FUNKTIONEN UND GRENZEN DER RECHTSANGLEICHUNG NACH ART. 100
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national chains in order to create an internal European market. A
6 was assigned the task of creating a Eurogeneral legal frameworkw
pean competition system and of guaranteeing freedom and equality of
competition. This freeing of economic forces can in some ways be
compared to the transition from the guild to the market system in the
19th century. 6' In this system, free competition was intended to be an
independently functioning mechanism for allocation, guidance and
distribution, thereby determining the best possible application of production factors and production results for meeting future needs.
The "role of the law" was designed to be closely related to this
concept of integration. If companies in a developing European indus62
trial society were to be able to compete beyond their national borders
and also with firms from overseas, 63 legal, administrative and tax barriers had to be removed. It was necessary to bring the European market structures and company structures still tied to national standards
into conformity so that the common basis of economic freedom of
movement, market equality and freedom of competition were not put
at risk.M Particular importance was attached to the integration of national corporate laws, the basis of which is found in article 54(3)(g) of
the EEC Treaty. According to this article, the rules which protect the
interests of shareholders and third parties applied within the meaning
of article 58, para. 2 of the EEC Treaty must be coordinated. This
method should guarantee equivalence of the harmonized national
rules. The managing function and organization should be mobilized
EWG-VERTRAG 137 (Schriften zum Wirtschafts -, Handels - und Industrierecht No. 14, 1976);
R. TSCHLNI, FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES GESELLSCHAFrSRECHTS 14 (1978).
60. Concerning the theoretical concept of a legal framework, see E. HOPPMANN, FUSIONSKONTROLLE 10 (Walter Eucken Institut, Vortrage und Aufsitze No. 38, 1972); F. v. HAYEK,
FREIBURGER STUDIEN -

GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE 47, 161 (1969).

61. R. TSCHA,NI, supra note 59, at 14; Joerges, Vordberlegungen zu einer Theorie des internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts, 43 RABELSZ 12 (1979); F. FENDEL, INDUSTRIEPOLrITK DER
EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFrSGEMEINSCHAFT 609 (Saarbricker Politikwissenschaft No. 3, J.
Domes ed. 1981).

62. Lecourt, Concentration et fusion d'entreprise,facteurs d'integration europenne?, 1968
REVUE DU MARCHA COMMUNE 6, 10; T. ABELTSHAUSER, EUROPAISCHE GMBH-FusION UND

UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNO 25 (1983); R. TSCHANI, supra note 59, at 14; EC Commission,
Problem der Unternehmenskonzentration im Gemeinsamen Markt, WIRTSCHAFT UND
WETrBEWERB 330 (1966).
63. J. BARMANN, EUROPAISCHE INTEGRATION IM GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 2 (1970).
64. In the past, there were a few European firms developing models of cooperation (Hoesch-

Hoogovens, Agfa-Gevaert, etc.); see Bayer, Horizontal Groups and Joint Ventures in Europe,
Concepts and Reality, in GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS 3 (K. Hopt ed. 1982);
Lutter, Empfehlen sich fir die Zusammenfassung europaischerUnternehmen neben oderstatt der
europdischen Handelsgesellschaft oder der internationalenFusion weitere M"glichkeiten der Gestaltung aufdem Gebiete des Gesellschafsrechts?,in VERHANDLUNGEN DES ACHTUNDVIERZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTZIGER, BAND I (GUTACHTEN), HI (1970).
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for the Community. 65
Although initially there was some uncertainty concerning the
scope of application of article 54(3)(g), it may be assumed that this
article cannot be restricted solely to questions of freedom of establishment. 66 In fact, according to general opinion today, article 54(3)(g)
should be interpreted broadly, in close connection with the general
clause of articles 100, 100A and 100B.67 For example, Friedhelm
Marx argues that articles 27, 54(3)(g), 56(2), 57(2), 99, 100 and 101 of
the EEC Treaty constitute a norm within itself, which could be regarded as a legal institution of the EEC Treaty and which is correspondingly based on a uniform basic concept and therefore must
assume a uniform function in the system established by the EEC
Treaty. 68 Since the Single European Act came into force, we must
now add articles 100A and 100B to this system.
This broad interpretation of article 54(3)(g) would lead to the harmonization of corporate law as a whole. The resulting laws subsequently could not be limited even by the concept of protective law
under article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, since, if interpreted more
precisely, all the rules of corporate law can also be regarded as protective rules in favor of either the shareholders or third parties, including
employees. 69
The harmonization of law, however, was based not only on the
principle of freedom of movement, but also on considerations of competition law. The general legal harmonization rules70 are intended to
eliminate unfair competition, 71 restrictive trade practices 72 and distortions of competition. 73 The proper functioning of the Common Mar65. R. TSCHXNI, supra note 59, at 15; E. MESTMXCKER, EUROPAISCHES WET-rBEWERBSRECHT 18 (1974); Everling, Die Rechtsangleichung in der Europadschen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
aufdem Gebiete des Niederlassungsrechts, inAKTUELLE FRAGEN DES EUROPXISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFrSRECHTS, EUROP)AISCHES KOLLOQUIUM, H 29, 60 (66). Concerning the concepts of
legal harmonization in the field of corporate law, see R. BUXBAUM & K. HoPT,LEGAL HARMO-

NIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 192-95 (Integration Through Law: Europe and the
American Federal Experience No. 2.4, M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe & J. Weiler eds. 1988);
Abeltshauser, Book Review, 35 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 130 (1990) (reviewing R. BUXBAUM
& K. HoPT,LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1988)).

66. Concerning the interpretation, see U. EVERLING, DAS NIEDERLASSUNGSRECHT IM
GEMEINSAMEN MARKT 41 (1963); BARMANN, supra note 63, at 38.
67. Pipkorn, Die Angleichung des europaischen Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrechts, 32
WIRTSCHAFr UND RECHT, SONDERHEFT UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 85, 93 (1980).
68. F. MARx, supra note 59, at 43; see also J. BXRMANN, supra note 63, at 39; Pipkorn, supra
note 9, at 511.
69. Pipkorn, supra note 9, at 513.
70. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 100-02.
71. Id. at art. 101.
72. Id. at art. 100.
73. See id. at arts. 101-02.
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ket links the harmonization of law to the realization of economic
freedom of movement, common or coordinated policies and fair competition within the Common Market. 74 Mestmicker thus clarifies the
functional relationship between the rule of law and the economic system, which constitutes one of the undisputed principles of harmonization of law in his eyes. Correspondingly, another functional area of
the harmonization of corporate law and especially the law concerning
the constitution of the firm is the pursuit and achievement of fair competition. The influence of this principle is manifested in the creation of
uniform principles concerning disclosure and accounting."
C. The Constitution of the Firm
The study of legal harmonization in the field of the company's constitution is particularly interesting, since the Community touches
deeply the fundamental values of the Member States. More legalization in the field of corporate structures has occurred. 76 An analysis of
this harmonization project thus promises to provide a scale by which
to measure the success of European integration and the limits of freedom of action within the community.
1. The Constitution under IndustrialPolicy Perspectives
of the Community
The optimistic, theoretical promises and hopes of an automatic differentiation of the internal European market and European industrial
structures did not materialize. European corporations and common
strategies for the building up of a European industry developed only
slowly. But an increasing awareness of threats from potential overseas
competitors, as well as an increasing sensitivity to situations of economic crisis, led to the first proposals for medium-term economic
planning in 1962, followed by plans for a European industrial policy in
1965. These plans, particularly the ideas arising from French plan74. E. MESTMACKER, supra note 65, at 98.
75. See Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on
consolidated accounts, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1983); Fourth Council Directive of25
July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978); Premire directive du Conseil, du 9 mars 1968,
tendant d coordonner pour les rendre equivalentes, les garanties qui sont exiges, dans les Etats
membres des sociftds au sens de l'article 58 deuxime alinea du traiti pour protiger les intdrits
tant des associs que des tiers, 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 65) 8 (1968); see also Lutter, Rechtliehes Gewicht und rechtspolitische Bedeutung der 4. Richtlinie, in RECHTSANGLEICHUNG NACH
NEUEM REcHT 3 (1980).
76. R. BUXBAUM & K. Hor, supra note 65, at 250 (1988); KUbler, Verrechtlichung von
Unternehmensstrukturen, in VERRECHTLICHUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT, ARBEIT UND SOZIALER
SOLIDARITAT 167 (F. Kibler ed. 1984).
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ning principles described below, were initially met with extreme skep-

77
ticism from the German side.
An EEC industrial policy which encourages the EEC Commission
to achieve an active role with respect to and in the interest of all or a
section of the industrial firms in the Community 7 has evolved clearly
since 1967, in spite of initial contradictions. 79 The biggest problem,
disagreement between France and West Germany, was settled when
West Germany concurred that since European companies were not
large enough, concentration was necessary.8° Furthermore, the 196768 recession and the coal crisis sparked discussion of interventions by
public authorities and of an overall economic policy control. The European economic system could no longer be conceived of as a legal
order which is privately organized and simply protected by government. The responsibility for the functioning of external trade comes
back to the political and administrative system, while the nationality
of economic policy actions escapes from control by legal criteria of

81
conventional provenance.
In 1970, the Commission submitted a voluminous memorandum
on the industrial policy of the Community. 82 In spite of considerable
differences of opinion between the Member States concerning the emphasis to be placed on the structural or sectoral aspects of such a policy, the EEC Council finally succeeded in 1973 in passing a resolution
concerning the industrial policy of the Community together with a
program of action for common measures.8 3 Today the industrial policy of the Community is part of a general economic policy which contains guidelines for medium-term economic policy through programs
drawn up by the Council and by representatives of the governments of
the Member States meeting in the Council.84 The basic principles of
this industrial policy aim, among other objectives, to create a uniform
77. F. FENDEL, supra note 61, at
INDUSTRIEPOLMK IN WESTEUROPA

145; see also, EUROP)MISCHES GEWERKSCHAFrSINSTITUT,
(1981) (a comparative study of the varying conceptions of
industrial policy in the Member States).
78. F. FENDEL, supra note 61, at 163; R. HELLMANN, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VEITRAG
ANHANG C AscHNrr ZUR INDUSTRIEPOLMK 3 (1983).
79. R. HELLMANN, supra note 78, at 5.
80. Lecourt, supra note 62, at 6.
81. Joerges, supra note 61, at 25.
82. EC COMMISSION, DIE INDUSTRIEPOLITIK DER GEMEINSCHAFF (1970) (Memorandum
of the Commission); F. FENDEL, supra note 61, at 163.
83. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 177) 1 (1973); R. HELLMANN, supra note 78.
84. Concerning the legal nature, see DIE EUROP.AISCHE GEMEINSCHAFr, supra note 2, at
282; concerning the 5th program from July 1982, see J. PIPKORN, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWGVERTRAO, VORBEM. ZU ART. 117-122 RDN. 44 (1981); Wilkinson, IndustrialPolicy in the European Community, in SCHRIFrEN DES ARBEITSKREISEs EUROPXISCHE INTEGRATION E.V. 31
(1987).
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legal, tax and financial order, particularly the restructuring of corporations in order to create a common corporate market. This is to be
achieved, apart from the application of European competition law, by
specific projects of legal harmonization in fields of law which hitherto
produced and partitioned national markets into watertight compartments, supplemented by law widely applied in the Community. Thus,
the Commission formulated a political program addressed to corporations, which shifts from the principle of individual adaptation of companies to modified market structures. 5
The "functions" of legal harmonization of corporate law were altered by this development. 86 Corporate law directives and regulations
lost their character as a general framework of rules of law. Instead,
they became materially more and more bound within the formulated
industrial policy program. The aim was to make it possible for corporations throughout the Community to work together with other such
corporations, to make contracts, to establish firms or to merge with
other companies, subject to conditions comparable to those with respect to formalities and security of law of individual States. 87 The
"policy of the law" revealed itself with the integration of political aims
into the legal harmonization programs.8 8 Today the program of legal
harmonization in the field of corporate law comprises industrial policy
functions. A uniform company constitution can considerably facilitate
cooperation between companies with different nationalities and very
different board structures. Similar arguments are also used to support
the harmonization of co-determination law. Such differences must be
removed because they constitute an obstacle to the institution of Community regulations concerning international measures for reorganization and mutual interpenetration of companies. 89 Furthermore,
considerable problems of the interpretation of individual legal institutions may occur which are closely linked to company constitutions:
for example, certain legal obligations, the interest of the corporation,
duties of care, loyalty and liability. A corresponding harmonization of
these legal rules would appear to be appropriate in relation to the de85. See Mestmcker, Wettbewerbspolitik in der Industriegesellschaft, in DIE SICHTBARE
HAND DES REcHTS 125, 131, who does not agree with such a policy because it could contradict
the basic principles of European competition law.
86. Lutter, Die Entwicklung des Gesellschaftsrechtsin Europa, in 1975 EUROPARECHT 44, 49.
87. EC COMMISSION, supra note 82, at 140; Lutter, supra note 86, at 49.
88. Steindorff, Wirtschaftsordnung und Steuerung durch Privatrecht?, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR
L. RAISER 621 (1974); Steindorff, Politik des Gesetzes als Auslegungsmastab im Wirtschaftsrecht,
in FEsrscMRFr FOR KARL LARENZ 217 (1973).
89. 1972 Proposal, supra note 5; white Paper, supra note 14, at 12; Diubler, supra note 6, at
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sired industrial cooperation. 9°
2.

The Constitution under Competition and Social Policy
Perspectives of the EEC

In essence, European competition law and policy constitute an opposite pole to European industrial policy because the latter favors economic concentration in the way explained above while the former
controls concentration by avoiding monopolistic European market
structures. This polarization increases the importance of efforts to
harmonize corporate law and the constitution of the firm. The former
neo-liberal approach strongly related harmonization of corporate law
to certain economic constitutional law structures. 91 Today the national and the European legislator is confronted with a functional
change in competition and corporate law. Considering this change,
von der Groeben emphasizes 92 that, according to the intention of the
EEC Treaty, competition should not be understood as theoretical,
complete competition in a transparent market with a polipolistic market structure, a view which in his opinion would be based only on a
model theory with no practical value since economic concentration
within the Community is increasing. Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
protects the so-called "workable competition" model which is based
on a functionalist understanding of competition. Accordingly, competition is then bound instrumentally within the objectives of a welfare
state system in which economic functions (distribution of income,
composition of supply, control of production, technical progress, etc.)
are complemented by social policy objectives. 93 The optimum realiza-

tion of these functions is accomplished with optimum intensity of
competition, which, it is claimed, is achieved in the market form of
broad oligopoly. In addition, article 85(3) also shows the relativity of
the way in which principles are oriented purely toward competition.'
The declaration of exemption provided for under this article is subject
90. A European Industrial Continuum, BULL. EC, 10/81, at 20-21 (1981); European Parliament (EEC) Resolution on Enterprises and Governments in International Economic Activity, 24
O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 287) 25, 28 (1981); BULL. EC, Supp. 3/82 (1982).
91. Tschiini, Geselischafts- und Unternehmensverfassungsrecht im Lichte des Rechts der
Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, in 32 WIRTSCHAFr UND RECHT, SONDERHEFT UNTERNEHMENSREcHT 62, 68 (1980); R. TSCHANi, supra note 59, at 68.
92. See comments on Article 85 in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG VERTRAG (H. von der
Groeben, H. von Boeckh, J. Thiesing & C.-D. Ehlermann 3d ed. 1983); EC Commission, 9.
Bericht fiber die Wettbewerbspolitik 10.
93. Kantzenbach, Die Funktionsfdhigkeit des Wettbewerbs; weite Oligopole als Wettbewerbsbedingung, in WETBEWERBSTHEORIE 194, 194-97 (K. Herdzina ed. 1975); R. SCHOLZ,
KONZENTRATIONSKONTROLLE UND GRuNDGEsETz 61 (Abhandlungen aus dem Gesamten
Birgerlichen Recht - Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht No. 43, 1971).
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to exceptions for weak participants in the market in relation to certain
94
goals of industrial, structural and middle class policies of the EEC.
European company constitution rules should therefore be subsumed under competition policy objectives,9 5 since harmonization of
company constitution rules and legal structures for co-determination
rights means similar structural requirements and social cost burdens
for companies operating in more than one country within the Community. This can prevent threatened distortions of competition, advance
equality of competition and offer protection against a flood of co-determination - a fear created by the German situation.
In addition to the increasing influence of competition policies on
European company law, the welfare state and social policies also develop a certain influence on this field of law. Social costs in the context of the discussion concerning article 117 of the EEC Treaty (rules
concerning the social policy of the Community and the harmonization
of social welfare provisions of the Member States) were initially regarded as being neutral for competition and company law. Only in
exceptional cases did social differences appear relevant to competition
and require a harmonization of law. 96 On the other hand, the Social
Policy Action Program of the Community, 97 created in 1974, proves
that just as much importance was attached to energetic measures, in
the social sphere as to the achievement of the economic and monetary
union. 98 Correspondingly, there also are references to the necessity for
co-determination rights in company decisions in the fourth program
for the medium-term economic policy of the Community of March 14,
1977. 99
An essential problem of harmonization of company constitution
law is posed by the rapidly increasing internationalization of produc94. D. THOMPSON, DIE WETTBEWERBSPOLMK IN DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT

21

(Walter Euckun Institute, Vortrage und Aufsfitze No. 64, 1978); 25 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L
314) 34 (1982).
95. Pipkorn, The Legal Framework of Employee Participation Methods on the National and
International Level and Particularly Within the European Community, in 1 SAGE, ECONOMIC
AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 99, 119 (1980); Employee Participation and Company Structure,
BULL. EC, Supp. 8/75 (1975).
96. T. A1ELTSHAUSER & J. PIFKORN, supra note 49, at 96,

97. Council (EEC) Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme, 17
O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C 13) 1 (1974).

98. Pipkorn, Die Bedeutung der Rechtsvergleichung fUr die Harmonisierung sozialrechtlicher
Normen in den Europa"ischen Gemeinschaften, in SOZIALRECHTSVERGLEICH IM BEzuGSRAHMEN INTERNATIONALEN UND SUPRANATIONALEN RECHTS 229, 239 (Schriften reihe fir
Internationales und Vergleichendes Sozialrecht No. 2, H.F. Zacher ed. 1978).
99. Council (EEC) Decision of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of
the Member States, Meeting Within the Council, of 14 March 1977 adopting the fourth mediumterm economic policy programme, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 101) 1 (1977).
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tion structures which caused completely new problems and conflicts
for several social groups. There were no legal precautions against this
development in the Member States, and today such precautions are
evolving only hesitantly. 0°
The harmonization of company constitution rules is further justified by the fact that the sphere of co-determination laws stops at the
national frontiers of the Member States. Cases extending beyond national borders can thus not be handled uniformly, unless the companies concerned develop an independent private dispute settlement
system, such as the cooperation model of Hoesch-Hoogovens.10 1 Of
course, one must also realize that rules harmonized and transformed
into national laws concerning the constitution of the firm and co-determination rights cannot extract themselves from the national legal
order. Nonetheless, such a project helps to provide the basis for primary EEC law, and at the same time creates the possibility of uniform
dispute resolution procedures throughout Europe.

IV.

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THE NEW FIFTH DIRECTIVE

Naturally there are many potential criticisms of the methods of
harmonization of corporate law. As the process of European integration progressed, it became evident that the shifting over of broad functional spheres from the Member States to community organs would
become increasingly difficult due to the implied loss of political deci-

sion-making power. Furthermore, doubts arose concerning the legitimation of the Council's authority, only very indirect, to establish rules
while excluding the European Parliament.
Since the middle of the 1970's there has been increasing stagnation
of the harmonization process in many areas of law. This stagnation
was further enhanced by national economies that were shaken by crisis
and by growing protectionist efforts. One consequence of the evident
stagnation in the integration process, as noted by Nagels and Sorge,
was the Commission's anticipation of separate national interests in its
100. Wanner & Peccei, Management Decentralization and Worker Participationin a Multinational Company Context, in WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONALIZED ECON-

OMY 66 (1978).
101. H. Hofmann, Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in GeseUschaftsorganen und
grenziiberschreitende Unternehmenszusammenschliisse in den Europaischen Gemeinschaften 89
(1976) (unpublished dissertation, Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitit, Bonn); Ebenroth & Sura,
Transnationale Unternehmen und deutsches Mitbestimmungsgesetz, 144 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR DAS
OEsA TE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFrSREcHT 610 (1980); Lutter, Mitbestimmungsprobleme
im internationalenKonzern, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR ZWEIGERT 251 (1981); Grasmann, Internationale Probleme der Mitbestimmung, in ZErrSCHRIFr FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFrsRECHT 317, 328 (1973); Diubler, Mitbestimmung und Betriebsverfassung im
internationalenPrivatrecht, 39 RAnELsZ 444, 451 (1975).
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submissions so that the Council could be met.10 2 Nagels and Sorge
also noted that the Commission endeavored to support influential interest groups and made increasing use of these groups in order to
avoid a decision-lag and to increase chances of a decision in the Council. With respect to accounting for the interests of influential lobbies,
this criticism may seem exaggerated, because it is a widespread legislative practice to conduct hearings on the advisability and formulation
of proposed legislation. The views of Nagels and Sorge should not be
taken lightly, however, because their analysis of the decision-making
process in the Council highlights the method of striking compromises
and package deals in favor of the interests of individual Member
10 3
States.
In European company law, the beginnings of these trends were already evident in the discussions concerning the third directive' °4 on
the harmonization of national merger law which integrated British
legal ideas, manifesting a considerably more complicated system of
norms in comparison with earlier proposals. Great problems occurred
in the discussions concerning the fourth directive dealing with accounting law.105 About 41 national legislative options are visible
here,' °6 although the professional associations of certified public accountants in the Member States work closely together and could influence the harmonization process to make national legislation as
uniform as possible. Similar problems became evident in the directive
concerning accounting principles in groups of companies, which after
long and difficult negotiations recently passed the Council. 0 7 There
were also sharp differences of opinion concerning the proposed Vredeling directive on the supplying of information to and consultation with
employees of companies with a complex, and in particular, transnational structure.10 8 A directive concerning groups of companies has
been in preparation for more than 12 years and is still awaiting
102. See K. NAGELS & A. SORGE, supra note 54, at 35.
103. Everling, Moglichkeiten und Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung in der Europischen
Gemeinschaft, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR R. SCHMIDT 165, 170 (1976).
104. Third Council Directive of 9 October 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty concerning mergers ofpublic limited liability companies, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978).
105. Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the
annual accounts of certain types of companies, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978)
106. Jonas, Zur Problematik der 4. EG-Richtlinie (I), 29 DER BETRIEB 1361 (1978); Jonas,
Zur Problematik der 4. EG-Richtlinie (II), 29 DER BETRIEB, 1409 (1978); Timmermans, supra
note 48, at 25.
107. 1983 Proposal, supra note 30.
108. Commission (EEC) Proposal for a Council Directive on procedures for informing and
consulting the employees of undertakings with complex structures in particular transnational undertakings, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (1980); BULL. EC, Supp. 3/80 (1980).
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publication. 109
Another problem concerns the transformation of a directive into
national law, a process which has proved to be extremely difficult and
slow.' 10 In December 1982, the European Court of Justice found in
the action brought by the Commission against Belgium, Ireland, Italy
and Luxembourg for violation of the EEC Treaty, that on the grounds
of article 169 those Member States had committed the said infringements of contract with respect to the second directive.I' Finally,
since the transformation of the first directive int6 national law, doubts
have arisen in the Member States concerning the legal consequences.
If the Council issues a directive under article 189, para. 1, of the EEC
Treaty, then, according to article 189, para. 3, it binds any Member
State at which it is aimed, in relation to the intended objective. It
follows that national law, once brought into conformity, is no longer
fully available to subsequent national legal reforms, insofar as such
reforms contradict the objectives of the directive. Such reforms can
only be made possible via a formal process of change of a directive by
11 2
the European legislator or by a simplified process of adjustment.
Lutter points out that the cementing of corporate law stands in direct
3
contradiction with needs for flexible, rapid adjustment and reform."
The problems noted are also evident in projects for the harmonization
of the constitution of the firm.
A.

Harmonization of CorporateStructures and
Co-determinationRights

The revision of the fifth directive is certainly to be welcomed with
respect to the problems of legal harmonization in the field of the constitution of the firm and co-determination law. It is worth asking,
however, to what extent these rules are subject to an option policy
which favors individual Member State interests. Preference for such
an option policy would result in a purely formal harmonization of
company law, in which case one has to ask whether the demands of
functional equivalance under the EEC Treaty are being met.
109. Document of the EC Commission No. 111/1639/74 published in Zeitschrift flr das
Gesellschafts- trd Unternehmensrecht 14/1985, at 446.
110. Schwartz, .Wege zur EG-Rechtsvereinheitlichung: Verordnungen der Europdischen
Gemeinschaft oder Ubereinkommenunterden Mitgliedstaaten?, in FES=SCHRIFr FOR ERNST VON
CAEMMERER 1067, 1081 (1978).
111. See Commission v. Italy, 1982 E.C.R. 3547; Commission v. Belgium, 1982 E.C.R. 3555;
Commission v. Luxembourg, 1982 E.C.R. 3565; Commission v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 3573.
112. See DM EuRowpscm GEMEiNSCHAFr, supra note 2, at 180, 347; Timmermans, supra
note 48, at 28.
113. Lutter, supra note 86, at 52.
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Examination of individual rules support the already mentioned
pessimism. Of course, the declaration of the European Parliament, as

well as the new Memorandum concerning the fifth directive, require
the setting up of structural alternatives and in particular "equivalent"
systems. Thus this framework in its concrete formulation also shifts
from the concept of a transitional regulation, such as set up in the
Green Paper, toward a uniform system of alternative models of corporate structure and co-determination rights to be set up in the future.
The Commission chose the same method as in the new proposal of a
Statute concerning the European public corporation mentioned above.
Also open to criticism are the proposed rules' requirement of the
principle of "equivalence" and the Commission's more or less adherence to existing national rules in the field of corporate structure and
participation rights of employees. The proposed supervisory board
structure refers strongly to German and Dutch law. Correspondingly,
co-determination rights are linked to the supervisory board. 114 The
parity between representatives of the shareholders, who should still
keep the majority of votes, and employees on the supervisory board is
also an existing principle in German law. The co-optation system of
the directive derives from Dutch law.
The so-called employee committee regulated under articles 4(4)
and 4(7) of the directive is based on principles of countervailing powers favored especially in Great Britain, Italy, Portugal and Belgium.
The creation of co-determination rights by collective agreements
should meet legal requirements in Italy, Spain or Greece.
The board system under article 2 1(a) et seq. of the directive considers corporate structures such as in Great Britain, Ireland, France, Italy and Spain. Even if these countries do not recognize codetermination rights in the board at this time, the Commission's proposal is similar to ideas found in the French and British discussion
concerning a reform of the board which integrates certain participation rights for employees."15
As far as the principle of equivalence is concerned, it is true that
the supervisory board system could be brought into functional harmony with the managing board model," 6 but the rights of participa114. See 1972 Proposal, supra note 5, at art. 4.
115. See. eg., Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974, which institutionalized employee
committees at the plant level in Great Britain; concerning co-determination rights on the board
level, see the Bullock Report from 1977; concerning the French discussion, see the Rapport
Sudreau, LA REFORME DE L'ENTREPRISE (1975); see also Overrath, Zur Unternehmensreform in
Frankreich,in ZErSCHRIFr FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT 373 (1976); see

also the French Nationalization Act No. 83/155 (February 11, 1982).
116. Raiser, Fihrungsstrukturund Mitbestimmung in der Europdischen Aktiengesellschaft
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tion and intervention of employees in the different models are
considerably reduced with an independent body representing the employees which does not have rights and duties similar to those of a
supervisory board or unified board under co-determination. Similar
objections concern the very vaguely formulated option of setting up
co-determination rights by collective agreements, because there is a
choice between only one of the above-mentioned structural models.
Furthermore, the possibility that company-related collective agreements could constitute an equivalent regulatory system is overlooked.
Thus the proposal adopts requirements of the Green Paper which
would make sense only if logically linked to the above-mentioned
"transition period." At the same time, the risk of unwanted distortions of competition policy remains.
Fundamental reservations must also be expressed concerning the
relationship between the legal basis and the intention of the EEC
Treaty. It is true that hitherto our examination has shown that the
harmonization of the company's constitution and co-determination
structures is based upon article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty. The focus, however, was upon models in which company organization was
decisively influenced. The intention was to avoid disadvantages for
companies resulting from different organizational requirements under
article 52 of the EEC Treaty. In this case, co-determination rules were
also to be taken into account in proposed legislation for harmonizing
the structure of public corporations. The result turns out to be very
different, because co-determination is practiced externally via collective agreement negotiations. It must therefore be asked in the future
whether the fifth directive can still be based on article 54(3)(g). On the
other hand, one could argue that the proposed system of collective
agreement concerning co-determination rights automatically leads to a
system of participation which is only linked to the supervisory or unified board of a corporation and therefore remains within boundaries of
structural harmonization.
B.

The Interest of the "Enterprise"

Further objections concern articles 10(a)(2) and 21(q)(2) of the
proposed directive which regulate the so-called "interest of the enterprise." These rules, too, do not support the equivalence of the structural options. Under these rules, the members of the board and the
supervisory or controlling part of the board must act in the best internach dem Verdordnungsvorschlag der Kommission vom 25. August 1989, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR E.
STEiNDORFP ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG AM 13 MARZ 1990, at 201 (J. Boar, K. Hopt & K. Mailinder eds. 1990); Abeltshauser, Statutsvorchlag,supra note 22.
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est of the enterprise, particularly the interest of the shareholders and
the employees. As of today such a rule does not exist in the company
law of any Member State. Even in West Germany the interest of the
1 7
firm is merely the object of a very sophisticated legal discussion. 1
Taking these problems into account, one must question the sensibility of regulating such an issue on a supranational level. Even if it
turns out to be necessary, such a rule must of course apply not only to
executive and controlling board members, but also to members of the
employee committee proposed by the directive. Accordingly, it makes
sense that the proposed statute of the Societas Europa refers only to
the "interest of the corporation."
C. Harmonization of Liability Standards
Similar objections concern the duty of care and the duty of loyalty
under articles 10(a)(2), 21(q)(2), 4(d)(3) and 21(e)(3) of the proposed
directive. All members of the board, or the supervisory board, and the
employee board must take care not to publish secret information they
receive from the corporation. It could be questionable whether an employee representative should be bound by a similar duty of loyalty as a
shareholder, but in most Member States such principles exist and
should, therefore, be integrated into a legal harmonization project.
The question of which information is secret and which is not is normally an issue of the interest of the corporation. As long as the proposed directive is using the term "interest of the enterprise," similar
problems of interpretation arise. Also problematic is the fact that the
employee board is not bound to such an interest under the directive,
making it even more difficult to define exactly the duties of employee
representatives.
V.

ELEMENTS OF A NEW "STRATEGY" CONCERNING
LEGAL HARMONIZATION

A. Narrow Approach
The relevance of a theory and method for the standardization, harmonization, approximation, coordination or unification of law" 18 may
initially strike the convinced European as superfluous, since the EEC
117. T. BRINKMANN, supra note 35; A. GROOMANN, supra note 35; Raiser, Das Unternehmeninteresse, in FEsTSCHRIFr FOR R. SCHMIDT 101 (1976); Raiser, Unternehmensziele und
Unternehmensbegriff, 144 ZErrscHanFr FiR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND GESELLscmAmrScHTrr 206 (1980); C. ScHMIDr.LErrHoFF, supra note 35, at 45, 130.
118. Whether one has to use the term standardization, harmonization or coordination is not
very clear under the EEC Treaty. See EEC Treaty supra note 3, at arts. 3(h), 100, 100a, 100b,
117 (concerning approximation), 4(3)(g), 36(2), 57(2) (concerning coordination), 99 (concerning
harmonization); see also Gessler, Ziele und Methoden der Harmonisierungdes Gesellschaftsrechts
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Treaty after all guarantees and defines a related legal basis and a scope

of application for many areas of law. For example, article 100 of the
EEC Treaty, the basic rule concerning legal harmonization, is strongly
related to the basic objects of the Treaty regulated under article 2.

Since the Single European Act came into force, a similar relationship
can be identified between articles 100A and 100B and article 8A,
which particularly includes the establishment of a Single European
Market. The basic objects of the Treaty also define the function, range
and limits of legal harmonization. Concerning the function in particu-

lar, legal harmonization must, on the one hand, regulate differences
between the legal systems of the Member States which could disturb

the common policies mentioned above and, on the other, it must also
promote the common interests. 119 Therefore, we also could define
legal harmonization as harmonization of interests in the Community.

This would be the case if we redefine certain values of national legal
rules on a supranational, European level.120
It is also true that, considering the complexity of European integration, it may appear to be premature and irrelevant to judge too
pessimistically the wide-ranging work done by EEC institutions in the
field of legal harmonization. The major national codifications of legislation in the 19th century also went through a long ripening process, 1 21 to some degree a result of a dialectical reciprocal relationship
between law and social reality. Nevertheless, more account should be
taken of the criticism of legal harmonization which points to the no
longer recognizable inner relationship and link with the Common
Market. In other words, it is questionable whether present legal harmonization projects are still following the prerequisites of article 100,
particularly the requirements of equivalence and necessity, the principle of reasonableness, and direct influence on the establishment of a
1 22
common market.
In Great Britain, the Select Committee on the European Communities described certain deficiencies in the harmonization of European
der GmbH, in HARMONSIERUNG DES GESELLSCHAFISRECHTS UND DES STEUERRECHTS DER

OMBH IN EUROPA 9 (Centrale fUr GmbH ed. 1962).
1,
119. B. LANGENHEm

KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG ZU ART. 100 RDN. 4 (E.

Grabitz ed. 1988).
120. Id.
121. F. WIACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEuzErT UNTER
BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN ENTwicKUNG 99, 458 (1967).

BESONDERER

122. Bruha, Rechtsangleichung in der Europdischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 7 Deregulierung
durch "Neue Strategie"?, 46 ZErrSCHRiFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 1, 21 (1986); Weier, supra note 53, at 267.
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law in its report on the approximation of laws under article 100.123
The committee relates these deficiencies to the lack of a general theory
of legal harmonization which would provide criteria capable of achieving political consensus concerning the evaluation of the objectives and
the extent of community activities. 124 The Committee would like to
see the power of harmonizing law limited to economic purposes, unless specific political objectives of a closely related kind are concerned.
The "dynamic character" of legal harmonization is rejected under the
Committee's view in favor of a close direct relationship with the establishment and functioning of the Common Market. Finally, the Committee wants harmonization measures limited to the essential.
With this interpretation, the British view corresponds to the historical image of the EEC Treaty which suggests that the harmonization
of law can only be undertaken for economic purposes. Legal harmonization is thus restricted to a narrow area of regulation and ensures
rationality in the sense of security of law for supranational trade. Astonishingly, the Committee took a very positive view of efforts toward
present legal harmonization on the basis of this method. Apart from a
few exceptions (swimming pool water quality and protection of correspondence school students), all harmonization projects and directives
were considered to be covered by article 100.
Krekeler 125 recognizes the problems of legal harmonization and
also favors limitation to purely economic matters. Therefore he considers a broad interpretation of article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty inappropriate. The creation of unified standards in corporate law for
national and foreign corporations is completely adequate. In his opinion, further all-embracing regulatory mechanisms (in particular the
European Company statute) would have, at best, an academic but not
practical value. 126 Krekeler in fact pleads for a competition system for
national laws following the U.S. model. At the same time, different
conceivable levels of intensity of relations between a foreign company
and a specific legal order should provide corresponding regulatory
123. 22nd Report of the Committee from April 18, 1978, at 131; 394 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th
ser.) 111 (1978).
124. Seidel, Ziele und Ausmaoder Rechtsangleichung in der EWG - Zur britischen Auffassung, 14 EUROPARECHT 171 (1979).

125. H. KREKELER, WIRTWHAFrLICHE INTEGRATION UND GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT AMERIKANISCHE ERFAHRUNGEN UND EUROP)LISCHE IRRWEGE 171 (1973).
126. There are similar opinions concerning the new proposal of an S.E. Statute. See, e.g.,

Hauschka, Entwicklungslinien und Integrationsfragen der gesellschaftsrechtfichen Akttypen des
Europ'ischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, in DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr 85, 94 (1990); Kallmeyer, Die
Europdische Aktiengesellschaft - Praktischer Nutzen und M"ngel des Statuts, in DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr 103 (1990).
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parts for the personnel statute. 127 As a result, he rejects the harmonization of co-determination law on the basis of this method.
More recent contributions to the theory of legal harmonization are
based on an institutional level of considerations. 128 Institutions in this
sense are regarded as norms which provide the framework for an interconnected area of life as the result of an automatic process of solidification. Friedhelm Marx provides a precise analysis of the systematic
connection of articles 3(h) and 100, together with the respective special provisions like article 54(3)(g). From this analysis, he derives a

guiding principle running through the history of legal harmonization,
which he classifies in his conclusion as neo- or ordo-liberal. He then
proceeds to analyze the failure of legal harmonization as a failure of
the principal order forming the basis of the EEC Treaty.129
In its result, the investigation is disappointing because Marx rescues himself by a retreat to the certain and still recognizable "core
area" of legal harmonization using a restrictive interpretation. In doing so, in the final analysis, he remains caught up in the previously
criticized neo-liberal model.
In order to reduce the complexity of control, it may appear to be
useful and desirable to limit legal harmonization as narrowly as possible. So far, it is clear that the process of European integration is already very far advanced. In addition, the formulation of common
policies (industrial, competition, social or export policies, and European political cooperation) must affect the legal measures taken for
this process of integration and coordination. The rationality of legal
harmonization is thus related not simply and solely to giving legal security to supranational trade, but also to the social settlement of new
types of disputes which result from the internationalization of the
30
Common Market.
Indeed, we could follow the British view insofar as a careful development of harmonization measures is to be supported, but insofar as
this view also concerns the intensity of regulation and restriction to
the so-called "essential," taking into account the structure of national
laws, it would also appear to be too general. A theory of legal harmonization must be able to define criteria making it possible to more precisely determine what "essential" means. Krekeler's proposal to
regulate at most the recognition of legal persons in national legal or127. H. KREKELER, supra note 125, at 221.
128. See F. MARx, FUNKTIONEN UND GRENZEN DER RECH SANGLEICHUNG NACH ART.
100 EWG-VERTRAG (1976).
129. Id. at 137.
130. Seidel, supra note 124, at 180.

1264

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 11:1235

ders, in order to permit competition between these systems, does indeed appear attractive, but might well be detrimental to common
policies. Linking several possibly overlapping and contradictory national legal systems would also appear unfeasible. The practice of international private law shows furthermore that each legal order claims
priority of validity in the case of conflict, which according to Gropfeld
may lead to a falling apart of the applicable law in the respective states
involved. The application of two legal orders to a single corporation
would therefore appear to be practicable only insofar as these legal
orders are approximately equivalent in their fundamentals and the
legal nature of the corporation in the respective legal orders is characterized by at least similar principles.1 31 Inadequate harmonization or
the creation of protective rights for shareholders, minority shareholders, creditors or employees could further result in a move away from
legal systems with stricter social or competition policies.
In sum, legal harmonization appears to be unsuitable for a community interwoven not only on an economic level but also in all other
sectors of social order. Proposals for an all or partially embracing "lus
commune" in the sense of a unification of European law go in a different and often opposite direction. This includes the possibility of evolving uniform transnational legal structures which could promise
decisive improvements in law, particularly on the international
levels,1 32 and would also be subject to uniform rules of interpretation
by the European Court of Justice. Apart from the fact that unification
of law on the basis of the EEC Treaty constitutes only a partial aspect
in relation to legal harmonization under article 100 of the EEC Treaty,
unification of corporate structures and co-determination rights does
not have a chance, according to the above analysis.
B. Problem-orientedHarmonization
Using a so-called typological method for analyzing legal harmonization under the EEC Treaty, Schmeder disagrees that the EEC
Treaty should be based on a certain economic model because economic systems of the Member States based upon very different principles would avoid such an assumption. This becomes clear if we only
compare the decentralized economic system in West Germany to the
centralized economic system based on principles of planification in
131. Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung der RechtsfAhigkeit juristischer Personen, 31 RABELSZ 1,

37 (1967).
132. Neuhaus & Kropholler, Rechtsvereinheitlichung -Rechtsverbesserung?, 45 RABELSZ 73,
83 (1981); David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW

(1971).
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France. In this context, competition is certainly one of the most important, but not the only element of coordination in the Common
Market.
In order to harmonize a certain subject matter methodologically
one should first ask whether there are facts which have to be regulated
on an international level. We could suppose that the coordination of
corporate structures would fit under such a requirement because cooperation between different national corporations is a very important element of the European integration process. In a second step, one
should compare different national legal rules which regulate these
facts and analyze differences and common approaches. The problem,
of course, is whether one should compare these rules only technically,
harmonizing them in a last step on the basis of very abstract principles
and values,1 33 or whether one should first determine certain problems
and the way in which the national legislatures regulate them. In the
guiding congress on comparative law in 1900, Salleilles pointed out
that it would be necessary to search for different solutions concerning
a certain problem by using empirical methods. Salleilles himself proposed a 4-step method:
Search for legal rules and principles in other national legal
systems;
Comparative analysis;
Analysis of effects of these rules and principles;
Transformation into one's own legal order or approximation
of legal rules.' 3 '
In addition, Zweigert and K6tz relate such an analysis to particular social needs and problems on the basis of functional comparative
legal analysis. Therefore, the first question has to be asked in a functional way and the problem has to be defined without any link to national legal terms. Grossfeld also points out that it would be
impossible to deal adequately with complex legal phenomena which
are based on a certain cultural and historical development when using
135
only a very technical method.
Following these functional approaches, a comparative study as
part of a harmonization project should not only locate certain national
rules and legal institutions but also look to the real social problems to
133. See the critical remarks of K. ZWEIGERT & H. KMTz, I EINFOHRUNG IN DIE REcHrSVEROLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES PRIvATREcHis 4 (1984); Ziegert, Juristische und sozio-

logische Empirie des Rechts - Genese und Zukunft der Rechsvergleichung als wissenschaftliches
Problem des europdischen Rechts, 45 RABEsZ 51, 59 (1981); Grossfeld, Probleme der Rechtsvergleichung im VerhaItnis Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika - Deutschland, 39 RABELSZ 5 (1975).
134. Ziegert, supra note 133, at 61.
135. See Grossfeld, supra note 133, at 11.
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be regulated and the effects such rules would have on a European
level. Choosing such an approach probably leads to a method which
has to take into account a sociological analysis of facts. 136 The methodological approach to such an analysis is of decisive importance to
the identification of problems as well as the effects that such harmonized rules will have in the future.
Going a step further, Schmeder generally locates the main problem
in different interests. A comparative analysis would have to search for
certain interests and conflicts of interests as well as the way in which
national legislatures control such conflicts. Concerning the constitution of the firm, we would therefore have to locate certain conflicts of
interest which a legal harmonization project must take into
137
account.
In the opinion of Friedman and Teubner, the general crisis of
traditional legal concepts requires a new theory of legal harmonization.1 38 The so-called "policy of law" manifests itself in the formal
laws139 and in increased state intervention. Former legal rules in the
form of conditional programs would increasingly acquire the character
of purpose-oriented programs. Unfortunately, Friedman and Teubner
do not develop their approach any further. As it is, it is difficult to use
these ideas for our problem. For example, questions arise as to which
direction legal harmonization theory should develop in detail under
such an approach, and what effects the approach would have. Isn't it
possible that purpose-oriented rules lead to an expansion of legal harmonization, or could we relate harmonization of law to specific
problems of the European integration process? Friedman and
Teubner do not reply to these questions. But in summarizing the different functional approaches and the basic problems of legal harmonization (e.g., very expansive harmonization in detail, very complex
negotiations in the EEC Council which take more and more time
under the principle of unanimity and very broad interpretation of article 100), we could assume that it is necessary to search for a "new
136. Falke, Gessner & H61and,Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung als Vorstufe internationaler
Rechtsvergleichung am Beispiel des Arbeitsrechts, 45 RABELSZ 268 (1981); Bartels, Rechtsvereinheitlichung zwischen unterschiedlichen Gesellschaftsordnungen, 45 RABELSZ 106, 120 (1981);
H. BARTELS, METHODE UND GEGENSTAND INTERSYSTEMARER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 123
(1982).
137. B6rner, Rechtsangleichung als Interessenangleichung - Die Wirtschafts- und Wahrungsunion, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR KEGEL 381, 384 (1977).
138. Friedman & Teubner, Legal Education and Legal Integration: European Hopes and
American Experiences, in 3 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 345 (1986).
139. M. WEBER, WIRTSCHAFr UND GESELLSCHAFT 503 (5th ed. 1980); Hart & Joerges,
Verbraucherrecht und Marktokonomik: Eine Kritik ordnungstheoretischer Eingrenzungen der
Verbraucherpolitik, in WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT ALS KRITIK DES PRIVATRECHTS 83 (1980).
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strategy" of legal harmonization. In other words, we have to ask
whether the process of identifying new harmonization projects and the
method of designing the contents of a directive in order to avoid later
problems of transformation into national law have to be redefined. 140
We have already assumed that legal harmonization projects should
not be limited to economic issues of European integration because social conflicts also need to be taken into account. In addition, the Single European Act from 1986 deals with the social, consumer and
environmental policies of the Community 141 and looks to a high standard of harmonization in these areas.
Following these principles, deregulation which avoids very specific
legal harmonization directives seems not to be in sight. Therefore, we
have to ask whether one can localize other methodological approaches
concerning legal harmonization in the so-called "White Paper" of the
Commission 142 or the Single European Act concerning articles 57(2),
70, 100A, 100B, 84(2), 118A, 130S and 8A.
The Commission proclaimed a first approach concerning a new
harmonization method in the White Paper of 1985. A so-called "minimal or core harmonization" should replace the very broad and detailed harmonization. 143 Furthermore, legal harmonization of certain
national rules should only be used in cases where it is not possible to
recognize national rules as functionally equivalent. 144
Since the Single European Act came into force on July 1, 1987, we
can find these principles in the reformed EEC Treaty, in particular
articles 8A(1), 100A and 100B. Under article 100a(1), the Council
can now decide over certain measures concerning legal harmonization
and the establishment and the functioning of the Single European
Market by a "majority vote." The Community should establish the
Single European Market by December 31, 1992, under article 8a of the
EEC Treaty.
Following these new principles, we could argue that future harmonization projects should in fact be related much more to core problems
140. Concerning the different steps of defining, formulating and transforming harmonization
projects, see Miiller-Graff, Die Rechtsangleichung zur Verwirklichung des Binnenmarktes, 24
EUROPARECHT 107 (1989).

141. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 100a(3).
142. E.C. COMMISSION, ESTABLISHING THE INTERNAL MARKET (1985) (White Paper of the
Commission for the European Council).
143. Id at 61.
144. Bruha, Rechtsangleichung in der Europcisehen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft - Deregulierung
durch neue Strtegie?, ZErIscHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKER-

RECHT [ZA6RV] 1, 7 (1986); Muiller-Graff, supra note 140, at 111; Hayder, Neue Wege der
europaisehen Rechtsangleichung? Die Auswirkungen der Einheitlichen Eurpdischen Akte Von
1986, 53 RABELSZ 622 (1989).
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of the integration process than they have in the past. The principle of
functional equivalence and the possiblity of recognizing national legal
rules on a European level could modify the type of directives in the
sense that they could be de-legalized or discharged from complexity.
Finally, the majority vote in the Council could accelerate the decisionmaking process remarkably.
Pescatore is more critical, pointing to very difficult problems in
interpreting the term "Single European Market"'1 45 because the differences between a "Single European" and an "Internal Market" are not
at all clear. 1 " We can see similar problems of interpretation in the
German literature concerning European law today. On one hand, one
could argue that the term Single European Market includes a certain
limitation compared to the Common Market. On the other hand,
both terms might be defined as synonymous or as complementing one
another.1 4 7 In addition, article 100A requires "positively" the identification of harmonization measures.' 48 One should ask, however,
whether they would rather support a very detailed harmonization of
law, or alternatively, what the limits of such a harmonization method
should be.
Finally, one should ask whether so-called "functionally related
harmonization measures" under article 100A(l) are a basic innovation
in comparison to harmonization measures to be taken under article
100, which are also functionally related to the basic purposes of the
Treaty. We might even argue that legal harmonization under article
100a is limited to purely economic aspects of the Single European
Market. In addition, article 100A(2) leads to a curious dual character
of the harmonization process. If we assume that the term of the Single
European Market' 49 concerns only economic aspects of integration
and free trade, every harmonization project which does not concern
these aspects would have to be based on article 100 which follows the
old method of legal harmonization and requires unanimity.
145. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 8a and 100a.
146. See Pescatore, Die "Einheitliche Europaische Akte" - Eine ernste Gefahr fi'r den
Gemeinsamen Markt, 21 EUROPARECHT 153, 157 (1986); Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on
the "Single European Act", 24 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 9 (1987).
147. See Miiler-Graff, supra note 140, at 123; Hayder, supra note 144, at 635.
148. Concerning positive and negative integration, see N. REICH, SCHUTZPOLmK IN DER
EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT IM SPANNUNGSFELD VON RECHTSSCHUTZNORMEN UND INSTITUTIONELLER INTEGRATION 20 (1988); N. REICH, F6RDERUNO UND SCHUTZ DIFFUSER INTERESSEN DURCH DIE EuROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFFEN 42, 157 (1987); see also Mifller-Graff,

supra note 140, at 129.
149. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art.
100a.
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As long as the fifth directive also concerns co-determination rights
for employees of a corporation, the statutory basis has to be article

54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty rather than article 100A, which explicitly
excludes harmonization projects concerning the rights of employees.
One proposal to facilitate negotiations concerning the fifth directive
therefore would be to harmonize co-determination rights independently and exclusively by a special directive. By using such a method,
the European legislator could base the fifth directive regarding only
the structure of the corporation on article 100A. The advantage of
this method would be to link these structural issues more closely with
the establishment of the Single European Market in 1992. Another
advantage of a special co-determination directive is that it could regulate not only participatory rights of employees but also other subject
matters like information and consultation rights in groups of companies. It would also be possible to relate such a directive to the Statute
of the European Corporation (Societas Europea), making it unnecessary to harmonize these questions by a special S.E. co-determination
directive.
Nevertheless, future discussion in this area should consider
whether the new strategy of legal harmonization under the Single European Act should not be one generally applicable to the whole process of harmonization of law in the Community. This also seems to be
the basic concern of the Commission's White Paper. Therefore, the
general problem posed by a new strategy of legal harmonization will
be the difficulty of developing new criteria concerning the identification of problems requiring the harmonization of national rules, criteria
for the design of these rules, and criteria for how to transform them
later into national law.

